Multidimension: a dimensionality extension of simple games
In voting theory and social choice theory, decision systems can be represented as simple games, i.e., cooperative games defined through their players or voters and their set of winning coalitions. The weighted voting games form a well-known strict subclass of simple games, where each player has a vo...
| Autores: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositorio: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/398135 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/398135 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40314-023-02471-y |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Voting -- Mathematical models Game theory Weighted voting games Dimensionality Codimensionality Canonical minimum representation Vot -- Models matemàtics Jocs, Teoria de Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences Classificació AMS::90 Operations research, mathematical programming Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs |
| Sumario: | In voting theory and social choice theory, decision systems can be represented as simple games, i.e., cooperative games defined through their players or voters and their set of winning coalitions. The weighted voting games form a well-known strict subclass of simple games, where each player has a voting weight so that a coalition wins if the sum of weights of their members exceeds a given quota. Since the number of winning coalitions can be exponential in the number of players, simple games can be represented much more compactly as intersections or unions of weighted voting games. A simple game’s dimension (codimension) is the minimum number of weighted voting games such that their intersection (union) is the given game. It is known there are voting systems with a high (co)dimension. This work introduces the multidimension as the minimum size of an expression with intersections and unions on weighted voting games necessary to obtain the considered simple game. We generalize this notion to subclasses of weighted voting games and analyze the generative properties of these subclasses. We also characterize the simple games with finite generalized multidimension over the set of weighted voting games without dummy players. We provide a comprehensive classification for simple games up to a certain number of players. These results complement similar classification results for generalized (co)dimensions. Our results show how generalized multidimension allows representing more simple games and more compactly, even for a small number of players and for subclasses. |
|---|