El significado de «derecho» y el concepto de derecho
John Finnis advocates in <em>Natural Law and Natural Rights </em>a conceptual and practical investigation of law that identifies its <em>central case </em>and rejects attempts to formulate a concept common to competing descriptive legal theories. This study questions this met...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/61660 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/61660 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | derecho -concepto teoría jurídica metodología descripción |
| Sumario: | John Finnis advocates in <em>Natural Law and Natural Rights </em>a conceptual and practical investigation of law that identifies its <em>central case </em>and rejects attempts to formulate a concept common to competing descriptive legal theories. This study questions this methodological approach and argues that forming a neutral concept of law is a sensible and important theoretical objective; and that the common meaning of the word «law» is a viable starting point for achieving it. The <em>central case </em>method is inappropriate for a descriptive legal theory because it applies an interpretation of that centrality that arises from a particular conception of law; and it excludes that law could have the negative value described bycompeting conceptions. The central case method would be apt if law is a specific phenomenon described and named in the past which is now the precise reference of «law». However, the prevalence of theoretical disagreements makes this hypothesis implausible and suggests that law is what human groups have historically recognised as such, as reflected in the use of the word «law» and its equivalents. |
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