So you think you can tell sense from nonsense, real doubts from sceptical games
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between different uses of language as mentioned in "On Certainty" and his distinction between meaningful, s...
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| Tipo de recurso: | libro |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2006 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Alcalá (UAH) |
| Repositorio: | e_Buah Biblioteca Digital Universidad de Alcalá |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ebuah.uah.es:10017/7436 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10017/7436 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951) Escepticismo Teoría del conocimiento Humanidades |
| Sumario: | In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy regarding scepticism succeeds or fails, I will examine his approach to certainty. To this end, I will establish a comparison between different uses of language as mentioned in "On Certainty" and his distinction between meaningful, senseless, and nonsense statements in the "Tractatus". This comparison has three advantages: first, it allows us to clarify the role of the so-called special propositions in "On Certainty"; second, it illuminates the relationship between some features of special propositions in On Certainty and the characteristics that define senseless statements in the "Tractatus"; and, finally, it shows the status of the so-called insight-ful nonsenses in the "Tractatus". As a consequence of this argument, I believe in a halfway house between the so-called traditional and new interpretations of "Tractatus". |
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