How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments

The political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third,less studied channel,namely,by changing how bureaucrats...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Toral, Guillermo
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:IE
Repositorio:Repositorio IE
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/3111
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12758
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3111
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85147263882&doi=10.1111%2fajps.12758&partnerID=40&md5=9391e9a0aa6fd809f8fa7f1d018ca0c2
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:59 Ciencia Política::5905 Vida política
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
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network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
Bureaucratic Accountability
and Service Delivery in Brazil
title How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
spellingShingle How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
Toral, Guillermo
59 Ciencia Política::5905 Vida política
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
title_short How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
title_full How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
title_fullStr How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
title_full_unstemmed How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
title_sort How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Toral, Guillermo
author Toral, Guillermo
author_facet Toral, Guillermo
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas
Lemann Foundation
https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 59 Ciencia Política::5905 Vida política
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
topic 59 Ciencia Política::5905 Vida política
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
description The political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third,less studied channel,namely,by changing how bureaucrats work. Patronage provides connections between bureaucrats and politicians,and thereby grants access to material and nonmaterial resources,enhances monitoring,facilitates the application of sanctions and rewards,aligns priorities and incentives,and increases mutual trust. Political appointments can thus enhance bureaucrats’ accountability and effectiveness,not just for rent-seeking purposes but also,in certain conditions,for public service delivery. I test this theory using data on Brazilian municipal governments,leveraging two quasi-experiments,two original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians,and in-depth interviews. The findings highlight the countervailing effects of connections on bureaucratic governance in the developing world. © 2023 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12758
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3111
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85147263882&doi=10.1111%2fajps.12758&partnerID=40&md5=9391e9a0aa6fd809f8fa7f1d018ca0c2
url https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12758
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3111
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85147263882&doi=10.1111%2fajps.12758&partnerID=40&md5=9391e9a0aa6fd809f8fa7f1d018ca0c2
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
IE University
Comparative Politics
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley and Sons Inc
publisher.none.fl_str_mv John Wiley and Sons Inc
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio IE
instname:IE
instname_str IE
reponame_str Repositorio IE
collection Repositorio IE
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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spelling How Patronage Delivers: Political AppointmentsBureaucratic Accountabilityand Service Delivery in BrazilToral, Guillermo59 Ciencia Política::5905 Vida políticaODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdadesThe political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third,less studied channel,namely,by changing how bureaucrats work. Patronage provides connections between bureaucrats and politicians,and thereby grants access to material and nonmaterial resources,enhances monitoring,facilitates the application of sanctions and rewards,aligns priorities and incentives,and increases mutual trust. Political appointments can thus enhance bureaucrats’ accountability and effectiveness,not just for rent-seeking purposes but also,in certain conditions,for public service delivery. I test this theory using data on Brazilian municipal governments,leveraging two quasi-experiments,two original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians,and in-depth interviews. The findings highlight the countervailing effects of connections on bureaucratic governance in the developing world. © 2023 The Authors. American Journal of Political Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Midwest Political Science Association.I am indebted to Ben Ross Schneider, Lily Tsai and Daniel Hidalgo for invaluable advice and guidance throughout the project. For useful comments I also thank Felipe Barrera-Osorio, Héctor Blanco, Sarah Brierley, Josh Clinton, Loreto Cox, Aditya Dasgupta, Emmerich Davies, Belén Fernández Milmanda, Charles Gale, Sandra Gomes, Merilee Grindle, Frances Hagopian, Kosuke Imai, José Incio, Junyan Jiang, Paul Lagunes, Horacio Larreguy, Noam Lupu, Nina McMurry, Virginia Oliveros, Agustina Paglayan, Jan Pierskalla, Ignacio Puente, Pia Raffler, Blair Read, Tesalia Rizzo, Fritz Sager, Christian Schuster, Alberto Simpser, Julia Smith Coyoli, Guadalupe Tuñón,Julie Anne Weaver and Liz Zechmeister; audiences at MIT, Harvard, UFRN, Vanderbilt, Yale-NUS, TEC, CIDE, Rutgers, NYU Abu Dhabi, ITAM, Northwestern, University of Gothenburg, WZB, IE University, UC3M, Georgetown, Oxford. APSA, MPSA, NEWEPS, PolMeth and REPAL; and three anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to the following 23 people, who provided excellent research assistance on the survey of bureaucrats: Jenair Alves, Marcos Aurélio Freire da Silva Júnior, Francymonni Yasmim Marques de Melo, Karoline de Oliveira, Raiany Juliete da Silva, Aline Juliete de Abreu Feliciano, Pedro Henrique Correia do Nascimento Oliveira, Ana Vitória Araújo Fernandes, Jaedson Gomes dos Santos, Ana Beatriz Germano Barroca, Renata Lima de Morais, Myleyde Dayane Pereira da Silva, Marina Rotenberg, Filipe Ramos Pinheiro, Daniele Vitória Lima da Silva, Elvira Gomes Santos, Matheus Oliveira de Santana, Magda Emanuele Lima da Silva, Ayanne Marília Sousa da Silva, Júlio César Nascimento, Lidiane Freire de Jesús. André Silva, and Pâmela Kaissa Fernandes Lopes. I also thank the State Audit Court of Rio Grande do Norte and in particular Gilberto Jales, Anne Carvalho, Victor Fernandes, Marcelo Araújo and Ilueny Santos, for making the survey of politicians possible. The Lemann Foundation, MIT GOV/LAB, MISTI and CIS provided financial support for fieldwork and surveys. Surveys and interviews were approved by MIT's Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (protocols 170593389, 1806407144, and 1810539206). Any errors are my own. This article was previously circulated under the title “The Benefits of Patronage: How Political Appointments Can Enhance Bureaucratic Accountability and Effectiveness.”yesPublishedJohn Wiley and Sons IncCentro de Investigaciones SociológicasLemann Foundationhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75202420242024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12758https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3111https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85147263882&doi=10.1111%2fajps.12758&partnerID=40&md5=9391e9a0aa6fd809f8fa7f1d018ca0c2reponame:Repositorio IEinstname:IEInglésIE School of Politics, Economics & Global AffairsIE UniversityComparative PoliticsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internationalhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/31112026-06-15T12:40:57Z
score 15.811543

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