Realism, reference & perspective

This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism (TSR), that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be fals...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Hoefer, Carl, Martí, Genoveva
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/175789
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/175789
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Realisme
Filosofia de la ciència
Referència (Filosofia)
Descripció (Filosofia)
Realism
Philosophy of science
Reference (Philosophy)
Description (Philosophy)
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spelling Realism, reference & perspectiveHoefer, CarlMartí, GenovevaRealismeFilosofia de la ciènciaReferència (Filosofia)Descripció (Filosofia)RealismPhilosophy of scienceReference (Philosophy)Description (Philosophy)This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism (TSR), that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with the Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns specifically for perspectival forms of SR.Springer Nature2021202120202021info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion28 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/175789Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00306-9European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2020, vol. 10, num. 3https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00306-9(c) Springer Nature, 2020info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1757892026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Realism, reference & perspective
title Realism, reference & perspective
spellingShingle Realism, reference & perspective
Hoefer, Carl
Realisme
Filosofia de la ciència
Referència (Filosofia)
Descripció (Filosofia)
Realism
Philosophy of science
Reference (Philosophy)
Description (Philosophy)
title_short Realism, reference & perspective
title_full Realism, reference & perspective
title_fullStr Realism, reference & perspective
title_full_unstemmed Realism, reference & perspective
title_sort Realism, reference & perspective
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hoefer, Carl
Martí, Genoveva
author Hoefer, Carl
author_facet Hoefer, Carl
Martí, Genoveva
author_role author
author2 Martí, Genoveva
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Realisme
Filosofia de la ciència
Referència (Filosofia)
Descripció (Filosofia)
Realism
Philosophy of science
Reference (Philosophy)
Description (Philosophy)
topic Realisme
Filosofia de la ciència
Referència (Filosofia)
Descripció (Filosofia)
Realism
Philosophy of science
Reference (Philosophy)
Description (Philosophy)
description This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism (TSR), that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with the Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns specifically for perspectival forms of SR.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
2021
2021
2021
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/175789
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/175789
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00306-9
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2020, vol. 10, num. 3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-020-00306-9
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Springer Nature, 2020
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Springer Nature, 2020
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 28 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Nature
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Nature
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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