Determinism and responsibility: a neuropsychological defence of criminal liability
The philosophical debate concerning free will and determinism has continued unresolved for millennia, the outcome of which allegedly carries critical implications for whether and how people are held responsible for their actions. The law generally presumes the existence of some manner of free will a...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/687734 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/687734 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Determinism Determinismo Neuropsicología Neuropsychology Free will Libre albedrío 34 |
| Sumario: | The philosophical debate concerning free will and determinism has continued unresolved for millennia, the outcome of which allegedly carries critical implications for whether and how people are held responsible for their actions. The law generally presumes the existence of some manner of free will and constructs the concept of responsibility on top of these foundations. Without entering directly into the philosophical debate, the present thesis adopts the opposing presumption that metaphysical free will is precluded by causal determinism and therefore does not exist. From this starting position, the question asked is how can people rationally be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe absent of metaphysically free decision-making? Part One of the thesis reviews an extensive body of empirical and theoretical research concerning decision-making in the human brain from the joint studies of neuroscience and psychology. The reasoning for this is twofold; on the one hand, and in very general terms, neuropsychology is broadly premised on the same presumptions of causal determinism which underpin the natural sciences – i.e., the physics of the macroscopic universe, chemistry, biology, and the biochemistry governing biological organisms. On the other hand, every action which results in criminal liability begins with a decision to act in the brain, whether occurring consciously or unconsciously. Part Two of the thesis subsequently takes conclusions and implications from the neuropsychology of decision-making and applies them to a critique of the legal concept of responsibility, focusing on the aspect of mens rea in particular. The thesis proposes replacing proof of subjective states of mind with proof of certain mental capacities that are necessary for responsibility – the capacities to exercise ordinary self-control, to recognise and respond to reason, and to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions. This approach is tested against leading jurisprudence to demonstrate its efficacy as a practical means of ascribing legal responsibility for criminal actions. Further implications are presented, such as replacing the notion of moral blame with that of unreasonable conduct as the theoretical underpinning to criminal liability, and denying any role for retributive theories of punishment. Finally, this capacity-based theory of responsibility is reintroduced into the wider philosophical debate between free will and determinism. Here, it is demonstrated how the theory provides a rational approach to holding people responsible for their actions in a deterministic universe and without any presumptions of, or reliance upon, metaphysical free will. |
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