Duality of welfare and profit maximization
Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey-Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist constrained...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/24753 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/24753 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Monopolis Monopolies Duopolis Beneficis Profit |
| Sumario: | Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey-Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist constrained maximization programs by proving the following 'folk theorem': max Welfare s.t. profit ≥ fixed cost ⇔ max Profit s.t. output ≥ minimum |
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