Lo relativo y lo absoluto en la concepción de Paul Natorp del método de la filosofía
Paul Natorp argues that the problem of method is the fundamental question of philosophy. However, this representative of Neo-Kantianism proposes two apparently irreconcilable methodological requirements: a) philosophy should be a first science that is independent of any other and, b) philosophy must...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/59162 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/59162 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Paul Natorp neokantismo de Marburgo método |
| Sumario: | Paul Natorp argues that the problem of method is the fundamental question of philosophy. However, this representative of Neo-Kantianism proposes two apparently irreconcilable methodological requirements: a) philosophy should be a first science that is independent of any other and, b) philosophy must start from the fact of science. The aim of this paper is to clarify how these two methodological requirements are combined in Natorp’s system. |
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