Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification

It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically la...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/145837
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/145837
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Teoria del coneixement
Evidència
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Theory of knowledge
Evidence
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
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spelling Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justificationToribio Mateas, JosefaTeoria del coneixementEvidènciaJustificació (Teoria del coneixement)Theory of knowledgeEvidenceJustification (Theory of Knowledge)It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification.Springer Verlag2019201920212019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion27 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/145837Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1795-7Synthese, 2021, Vol. 198, num. 7, p. 1529-1547https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1795-7info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415(c) Springer Verlag, 2021info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1458372026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
title Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
spellingShingle Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Teoria del coneixement
Evidència
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Theory of knowledge
Evidence
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
title_short Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
title_full Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
title_fullStr Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
title_full_unstemmed Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
title_sort Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author_facet Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Teoria del coneixement
Evidència
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Theory of knowledge
Evidence
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
topic Teoria del coneixement
Evidència
Justificació (Teoria del coneixement)
Theory of knowledge
Evidence
Justification (Theory of Knowledge)
description It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2019
2019
2021
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/145837
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/145837
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1795-7
Synthese, 2021, Vol. 198, num. 7, p. 1529-1547
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1795-7
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/675415
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Springer Verlag, 2021
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Springer Verlag, 2021
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 27 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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