Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Klaus, Bettina, Klijn, Flip
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
Repositorio:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
OAI Identifier:oai:digital.csic.es:10261/167380
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167380
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Implementation
Matching
Mechanisms
Stability
Substitutability
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spelling Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stabilityKlaus, BettinaKlijn, FlipImplementationMatchingMechanismsStabilitySubstitutabilityWe study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.B. Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) for Project 100018_156201. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).Peer reviewedElsevierSwiss National Science FoundationGeneralitat de CatalunyaMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]201820182017info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Postprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/167380reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSICinstname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)Inglés#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE##PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2014-59302-Pinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/SEV-2015-0563https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001Síinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1673802026-05-22T06:33:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
title Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
spellingShingle Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
Klaus, Bettina
Implementation
Matching
Mechanisms
Stability
Substitutability
title_short Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
title_full Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
title_fullStr Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
title_full_unstemmed Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
title_sort Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
author Klaus, Bettina
author_facet Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
author_role author
author2 Klijn, Flip
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Swiss National Science Foundation
Generalitat de Catalunya
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas [https://ror.org/02gfc7t72]
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Implementation
Matching
Mechanisms
Stability
Substitutability
topic Implementation
Matching
Mechanisms
Stability
Substitutability
description We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2018
2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167380
url http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167380
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv #PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
#PLACEHOLDER_PARENT_METADATA_VALUE#
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2014-59302-P
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/SEV-2015-0563
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001
Sí
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname:Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
instname_str Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)
reponame_str DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
collection DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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