On the Set of Balanced Games

We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the set of its extremal rays and facets. This study is also done...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: García Segador, Pedro, Grabisch, Michel, Miranda Menéndez, Pedro
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Institución:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Repositorio:Docta Complutense
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/125809
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/125809
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Cooperative TU games
Balanced games
Core
Convex polyhedra
Combinatorial polytope
Teoría de Juegos
Investigación operativa (Matemáticas)
1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
5311.07 Investigación Operativa
Descripción
Sumario:We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the set of its extremal rays and facets. This study is also done for the set of balanced games whose value for the grand coalition is fixed, which yields an affine nonpointed polyhedral cone. Finally, the case of nonnegative balanced games with fixed value for the grand coalition is tackled. This set is a convex polytope, with remarkable properties. We characterize its vertices and facets, study the adjacency structure of vertices, develop an algorithm for generating vertices in a random uniform way, and show that this polytope is combinatorial and its adjacency graph is Hamiltonian. Last, we give a characterization of the set of games having a core reduced to a singleton.