The meaning of 'literal meaning'

Although references to literal meaning are frequent in the legal field, it is not easy to determine what "literal meaning" means. In general, it seems to be considered as unproblematic not only by many legal scholars but also by lawyers and other participants in the legal practice....

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Autor: Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:España
Institución:Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Repositorio:Repositorio Digital de la UPF
OAI Identifier:oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/72248
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
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spelling The meaning of 'literal meaning'Ramírez Ludeña, LorenaLiteral meaningDescriptivismNew theories of referenceLegal interpretationAlthough references to literal meaning are frequent in the legal field, it is not easy to determine what "literal meaning" means. In general, it seems to be considered as unproblematic not only by many legal scholars but also by lawyers and other participants in the legal practice. In this paper I will show that this position comes about because an intuitive view of language is assumed according to which words are related by competent speakers to descriptions that determine reference. However, this descriptivist approach is shown to be problematic in reconstructing our linguistic practices. In contrast, New Theories of Reference (NTR) provide a plausible account of our common and legal uses of words. In this paper I will present a version of NTR that avoids the criticisms that are normally addressed to them. I will also show that this version of NTR has advantages when compared to the traditional descriptivist model. In the legal field, this version of NTR allows us a better understanding of how legal interpretation works.Edizioni ETS2026202620182026info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248reponame:Repositorio Digital de la UPFinstname:Universitat Pompeu FabraInglésAnalisi e Diritto. 2018:83-101Copyrights are transferred for five years starting publication date from the author(s) to the Publisher. After this period, the content is released under a Creative Commons licence (Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International).http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/722482026-06-12T07:21:37Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title The meaning of 'literal meaning'
spellingShingle The meaning of 'literal meaning'
Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
title_short The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_full The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_fullStr The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_full_unstemmed The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_sort The meaning of 'literal meaning'
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
author Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
author_facet Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
topic Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
description Although references to literal meaning are frequent in the legal field, it is not easy to determine what "literal meaning" means. In general, it seems to be considered as unproblematic not only by many legal scholars but also by lawyers and other participants in the legal practice. In this paper I will show that this position comes about because an intuitive view of language is assumed according to which words are related by competent speakers to descriptions that determine reference. However, this descriptivist approach is shown to be problematic in reconstructing our linguistic practices. In contrast, New Theories of Reference (NTR) provide a plausible account of our common and legal uses of words. In this paper I will present a version of NTR that avoids the criticisms that are normally addressed to them. I will also show that this version of NTR has advantages when compared to the traditional descriptivist model. In the legal field, this version of NTR allows us a better understanding of how legal interpretation works.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248
url https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Analisi e Diritto. 2018:83-101
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