A secure algorithm for inversion modulo 2k
Modular inversions are widely employed in public key crypto-systems, and it is known that they imply a bottleneck due to the expensive computation. Recently, a new algorithm for inversions modulo p k was proposed, which may speed up the calculation of a modulus dependent quantity used in the Montgom...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:216906 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/216906 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.3390/cryptography2030023 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Modular inversion Montgomery multiplication RSA Side channel attack |
| Sumario: | Modular inversions are widely employed in public key crypto-systems, and it is known that they imply a bottleneck due to the expensive computation. Recently, a new algorithm for inversions modulo p k was proposed, which may speed up the calculation of a modulus dependent quantity used in the Montgomery multiplication. The original algorithm lacks security countermeasures; thus, a straightforward implementation may expose the input. This is an issue if that input is a secret. In the RSA-CRT signature using Montgomery multiplication, the moduli are secrets (primes p and q). Therefore, the moduli dependent quantities related to p and q must be securely computed. This paper presents a security analysis of the novel method considering that it might be used to compute secrets. We demonstrate that a Side Channel Analysis leads to disclose the data being manipulated. In consequence, a secure variant for inversions modulo 2 k is proposed, through the application of two known countermeasures. In terms of performance, the secure variant is still comparable with the original one. |
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