Unobserved heterogeneity, exit rates and re-employment wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re-employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is sep...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Fernández-Blanco, Javier|||0000-0001-6788-5032, Gomes, Pedro
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:196484
Acceso en línea:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/196484
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1111/sjoe.12173
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Asymmetric information
Directed search
Unemployment duration
Descripción
Sumario:Exit rates from unemployment and re-employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance-related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.