Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ –...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/208370 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
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Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositionsGarcía-Carpintero, ManuelRepresentació (Filosofia)Proposició (Lògica)Representation (Philosophy)Proposition (Logic)Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense.Oslo University Press2021info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2021https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795(c) Oslo University Press, 2021info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2083702026-05-27T06:46:51Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| spellingShingle |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions García-Carpintero, Manuel Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| title_short |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_full |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_fullStr |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_sort |
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author |
García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_facet |
García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| topic |
Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| description |
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense. |
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2021 |
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2021 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
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article |
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acceptedVersion |
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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370 |
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Inglés |
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Inglés |
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Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795 Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2021 https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795 |
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(c) Oslo University Press, 2021 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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(c) Oslo University Press, 2021 |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
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Oslo University Press |
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Oslo University Press |
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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB instname:Universidad de Barcelona |
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Universidad de Barcelona |
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Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
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Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
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