Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions

Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ –...

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Autor: García-Carpintero, Manuel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/208370
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Representació (Filosofia)
Proposició (Lògica)
Representation (Philosophy)
Proposition (Logic)
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spelling Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositionsGarcía-Carpintero, ManuelRepresentació (Filosofia)Proposició (Lògica)Representation (Philosophy)Proposition (Logic)Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense.Oslo University Press2021info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2021https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795(c) Oslo University Press, 2021info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/2083702026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
title Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
spellingShingle Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
García-Carpintero, Manuel
Representació (Filosofia)
Proposició (Lògica)
Representation (Philosophy)
Proposition (Logic)
title_short Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
title_full Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
title_fullStr Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
title_full_unstemmed Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
title_sort Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv García-Carpintero, Manuel
author García-Carpintero, Manuel
author_facet García-Carpintero, Manuel
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Representació (Filosofia)
Proposició (Lògica)
Representation (Philosophy)
Proposition (Logic)
topic Representació (Filosofia)
Proposició (Lògica)
Representation (Philosophy)
Proposition (Logic)
description Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795
Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2021
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Oslo University Press, 2021
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Oslo University Press, 2021
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oslo University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oslo University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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