Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2010 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:171301 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/171301 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Games with externalities Sharing rules Dividends |
| Sumario: | In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values. |
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