Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress

The political power of labor unions is a contentious issue in the social sciences. Departing from the dominant focus on membership size, we argue that unions’ influence on national law making is based to an important degree on their local organization. We delineate the novel hypothesis that the hori...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Becher, Michael, Stegmueller, Daniel, Käppner, Konstantin
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:España
Institución:IE
Repositorio:Repositorio IE
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/3443
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1086/694546
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3443
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:59 Ciencia Política::5904 Instituciones políticas
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
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spelling Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US CongressBecher, MichaelStegmueller, DanielKäppner, Konstantin59 Ciencia Política::5904 Instituciones políticasODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdadesThe political power of labor unions is a contentious issue in the social sciences. Departing from the dominant focus on membership size, we argue that unions’ influence on national law making is based to an important degree on their local organization. We delineate the novel hypothesis that the horizontal concentration of union members within electoral districts matters. To test it, we draw on administrative records and map the membership size and concentration of local unions to districts of the US House of Representatives, 2003–12. We find that, controlling for membership size, representatives from districts with less concentrated unions have more liberal voting records than their peers. This concentration effect survives numerous district controls and relaxing OLS assumptions. While surprising for several theoretical perspectives, it is consistent with theories based on social incentives. These results have implications for our broader understanding of political representation and the role of groups in democratic politics.yesPublishedThe University of Chicago Presshttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75202520252018info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1086/694546https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3443reponame:Repositorio IEinstname:IEInglésIE School of Politics, Economics & Global AffairsIE UniversityComparative PoliticsAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 Internationalhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/34432026-06-15T12:40:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
title Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
spellingShingle Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
Becher, Michael
59 Ciencia Política::5904 Instituciones políticas
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
title_short Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
title_full Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
title_fullStr Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
title_full_unstemmed Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
title_sort Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Becher, Michael
Stegmueller, Daniel
Käppner, Konstantin
author Becher, Michael
author_facet Becher, Michael
Stegmueller, Daniel
Käppner, Konstantin
author_role author
author2 Stegmueller, Daniel
Käppner, Konstantin
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 59 Ciencia Política::5904 Instituciones políticas
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
topic 59 Ciencia Política::5904 Instituciones políticas
ODS 10 - Reducción de las desigualdades
description The political power of labor unions is a contentious issue in the social sciences. Departing from the dominant focus on membership size, we argue that unions’ influence on national law making is based to an important degree on their local organization. We delineate the novel hypothesis that the horizontal concentration of union members within electoral districts matters. To test it, we draw on administrative records and map the membership size and concentration of local unions to districts of the US House of Representatives, 2003–12. We find that, controlling for membership size, representatives from districts with less concentrated unions have more liberal voting records than their peers. This concentration effect survives numerous district controls and relaxing OLS assumptions. While surprising for several theoretical perspectives, it is consistent with theories based on social incentives. These results have implications for our broader understanding of political representation and the role of groups in democratic politics.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1086/694546
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3443
url https://doi.org/10.1086/694546
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3443
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv IE School of Politics, Economics & Global Affairs
IE University
Comparative Politics
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv The University of Chicago Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv The University of Chicago Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio IE
instname:IE
instname_str IE
reponame_str Repositorio IE
collection Repositorio IE
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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