Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much)
Rationale Central banks in some developed countries have started to record, or will soon record, losses. These losses are due to the structural changes in their balance sheets after the exceptional measures adopted during the economic crises of recent years, which were necessary to maintain price st...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Banco de España |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Institucional del Banco de España |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.bde.es:123456789/36255 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/36255 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Central banking Profit and loss Eurosystem Price stability Monetary policy Política monetaria Contabilidad bancaria Estabilidad de precios Bancos centrales y otras autoridades monetarias E52 E58 |
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Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much)Esteban García-Escudero, EnriqueRomo González, Luna AzaharaCentral bankingProfit and lossEurosystemPrice stabilityMonetary policyPolítica monetariaContabilidad bancariaEstabilidad de preciosBancos centrales y otras autoridades monetariasE52E58Rationale Central banks in some developed countries have started to record, or will soon record, losses. These losses are due to the structural changes in their balance sheets after the exceptional measures adopted during the economic crises of recent years, which were necessary to maintain price stability. This article explains why these losses are expected to be temporary and why central banks can continue to perform their functions and deliver on their mandate even when incurring losses. Takeaways •A central bank’s aim is not to maximise profits, but instead to use monetary policy to achieve price stability. •Central banks cannot be insolvent as they issue the currency (base money) with which they continue to cover their operating expenses and meet their present and future payment obligations. •There are numerous examples of central banks that have continued to deliver on their mandates even when incurring losses. In these cases, a robust legal framework that protects central banks’ autonomy is key.Banco de EspañaMadrid : Banco de España, 20242024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/36255reponame:Repositorio Institucional del Banco de Españainstname:Banco de EspañaInglésEconomic Bulletin / Banco de España, 2024/Q2, 01Versión en español 123456789/36273info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.bde.es:123456789/362552026-06-20T12:44:27Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| title |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| spellingShingle |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) Esteban García-Escudero, Enrique Central banking Profit and loss Eurosystem Price stability Monetary policy Política monetaria Contabilidad bancaria Estabilidad de precios Bancos centrales y otras autoridades monetarias E52 E58 |
| title_short |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| title_full |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| title_fullStr |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| title_sort |
Why a central bank’s bottom line doesn’t matter (that much) |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Esteban García-Escudero, Enrique Romo González, Luna Azahara |
| author |
Esteban García-Escudero, Enrique |
| author_facet |
Esteban García-Escudero, Enrique Romo González, Luna Azahara |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Romo González, Luna Azahara |
| author2_role |
author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Central banking Profit and loss Eurosystem Price stability Monetary policy Política monetaria Contabilidad bancaria Estabilidad de precios Bancos centrales y otras autoridades monetarias E52 E58 |
| topic |
Central banking Profit and loss Eurosystem Price stability Monetary policy Política monetaria Contabilidad bancaria Estabilidad de precios Bancos centrales y otras autoridades monetarias E52 E58 |
| description |
Rationale Central banks in some developed countries have started to record, or will soon record, losses. These losses are due to the structural changes in their balance sheets after the exceptional measures adopted during the economic crises of recent years, which were necessary to maintain price stability. This article explains why these losses are expected to be temporary and why central banks can continue to perform their functions and deliver on their mandate even when incurring losses. Takeaways •A central bank’s aim is not to maximise profits, but instead to use monetary policy to achieve price stability. •Central banks cannot be insolvent as they issue the currency (base money) with which they continue to cover their operating expenses and meet their present and future payment obligations. •There are numerous examples of central banks that have continued to deliver on their mandates even when incurring losses. In these cases, a robust legal framework that protects central banks’ autonomy is key. |
| publishDate |
2024 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024 |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| format |
article |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/36255 |
| url |
https://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/36255 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
Inglés |
| language_invalid_str_mv |
Inglés |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Bulletin / Banco de España, 2024/Q2, 01 Versión en español 123456789/36273 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Banco de España Madrid : Banco de España, 2024 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Banco de España Madrid : Banco de España, 2024 |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional del Banco de España instname:Banco de España |
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Banco de España |
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Repositorio Institucional del Banco de España |
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Repositorio Institucional del Banco de España |
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15.300724 |