What is "true" in internal realism?
This paper is a critical examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphysical to internal realism. First, I analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic view of truth. Though a p...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1996 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:47248 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/47248 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.5565/rev/enrahonar.592 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Veritat Putnam, Hilary Realisme intern Acceptabilitat Realisme metafísic Justificació Idealització Truth Internal realism Acceptability Metaphisical realism Justification Idealization |
| Resumo: | This paper is a critical examination of Putnam's theory of truth as it evolves from metaphysical to internal realism. First, I analyze the model-theoretic argument that led Putnam to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth as correspondence and to adopt and epistemic view of truth. Though a powerful critique of the metaphysical realist conception of truth, this argument does not establish conclusively that the concept of truth has any epistemic content. Secondly, I discuss Putnam's idealization theory of truth, arguing that the identification of truth with "acceptability under ideal conditions" is at odds with the claim that truth is context-transcendent, since the notion of justification is intrinsically context-dependent and no amount of idealization can reedeem its contextual character. Finally, I suggest that the realist intuitions that Putnam's internal realism tries to capture call for no more than a deflationary view of truth. Acceptance of this view requires abandoning not only the idea that truth is an epistemic property, but also the idea that truth is a substantive property that all true statements share and, therefore, a proper object of philosophical theorizing. |
|---|