Evaluating antitrust leniency programs

This article identifies and then quantifies econometrically the impact of leniency programs on the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policies in the business community using panel data for as many as 59 countries during a 14-year span. We use the dynamics of the gradual diffusion of lenie...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Borrell, Joan-Ramon, Jiménez González, Juan Luis, García Galindo, Carmen
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2013
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/104544
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/104544
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Dret de la competència
Condonació del deute
Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Antitrust law
Debt relief
Competition
Cartels
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spelling Evaluating antitrust leniency programsBorrell, Joan-RamonJiménez González, Juan LuisGarcía Galindo, CarmenDret de la competènciaCondonació del deuteCompetència econòmicaCàrtelsAntitrust lawDebt reliefCompetitionCartelsThis article identifies and then quantifies econometrically the impact of leniency programs on the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policies in the business community using panel data for as many as 59 countries during a 14-year span. We use the dynamics of the gradual diffusion of leniency programs across countries and over time to evaluate the impact of the program, taking care of the bias caused by self-selection into the program. We find that leniency programs increase the perception of effectiveness by an order of magnitude ranging from 10 percent to 21 percent. Leniency programs have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands of antitrust enforcers against the more damaging forms of explicit collusion among rival firms in the market place.Oxford University Press2013info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/104544Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht017Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2013, vol. 10, num. 1, p. 107-136https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht017(c) Borrell, Joan-Ramon et al., 2013info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1045442026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
title Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
spellingShingle Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Dret de la competència
Condonació del deute
Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Antitrust law
Debt relief
Competition
Cartels
title_short Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
title_full Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
title_fullStr Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
title_full_unstemmed Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
title_sort Evaluating antitrust leniency programs
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
García Galindo, Carmen
author Borrell, Joan-Ramon
author_facet Borrell, Joan-Ramon
Jiménez González, Juan Luis
García Galindo, Carmen
author_role author
author2 Jiménez González, Juan Luis
García Galindo, Carmen
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Dret de la competència
Condonació del deute
Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Antitrust law
Debt relief
Competition
Cartels
topic Dret de la competència
Condonació del deute
Competència econòmica
Càrtels
Antitrust law
Debt relief
Competition
Cartels
description This article identifies and then quantifies econometrically the impact of leniency programs on the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policies in the business community using panel data for as many as 59 countries during a 14-year span. We use the dynamics of the gradual diffusion of leniency programs across countries and over time to evaluate the impact of the program, taking care of the bias caused by self-selection into the program. We find that leniency programs increase the perception of effectiveness by an order of magnitude ranging from 10 percent to 21 percent. Leniency programs have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands of antitrust enforcers against the more damaging forms of explicit collusion among rival firms in the market place.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/104544
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/104544
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht017
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2013, vol. 10, num. 1, p. 107-136
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht017
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Borrell, Joan-Ramon et al., 2013
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Borrell, Joan-Ramon et al., 2013
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,301603

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