Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism

This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their co...

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Autor: Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2011
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/161924
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/161924
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Conceptes
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Concepts
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spelling Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual NonconceptualismToribio Mateas, JosefaFilosofia de la mentPercepcióConceptesPhilosophy of mindPerceptionConceptsThis paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state / content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of 'state/content error error', i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception.Taylor and Francis2020202020112020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion17 p.application/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/161924Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.558836Philosophical Psychology, 2011, vol. 24, num. 2, p. 177-193https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.558836(c) Taylor and Francis, 2011info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1619242026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
title Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
spellingShingle Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
Toribio Mateas, Josefa
Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Conceptes
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Concepts
title_short Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
title_full Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
title_fullStr Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
title_full_unstemmed Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
title_sort Compositionality, Iconicity, and Perceptual Nonconceptualism
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author_facet Toribio Mateas, Josefa
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Conceptes
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Concepts
topic Filosofia de la ment
Percepció
Conceptes
Philosophy of mind
Perception
Concepts
description This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state / content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of 'state/content error error', i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
2020
2020
2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/161924
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/161924
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.558836
Philosophical Psychology, 2011, vol. 24, num. 2, p. 177-193
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.558836
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Taylor and Francis, 2011
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Taylor and Francis, 2011
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 17 p.
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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