Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight sy...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/171456 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/171456 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Teoria de jocs Cooperative games (Mathematics) Game theory |
| Sumario: | A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open, which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system, the weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM (...) |
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