False belief and relative clauses in autism spectrum disorders
Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of languagethat relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear.Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect,arguably im...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Digital de la UPF |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/42468 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/42468 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcomdis.2018.04.001 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Theory of Mind False belief Relative clauses Meta-representation Intensionality Autism Spectrum Disorders |
| Sumario: | Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of languagethat relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear.Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect,arguably implied in FB, one expects a link between FB and not only complementation but alsorelativization. Seventeen children with ASD (6 to 16 years, mean age 9;2) were assessed for RCsand FB. Comprehension of RCs significantly predicted FB performance, while none of the con-trolled factors played a predictive role (comprehension of simple sentences, vocabulary, morpho-syntax and working memory). Findings suggest that clausal embedding, common to both sen-tential complements and RCs, serves as a bootstrap for FB reasoning. |
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