Non-centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical Insight
This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or d...
| Autores: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Sevilla (US) |
| Repositorio: | idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:idus.us.es:11441/87424 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/11441/87424 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2017.06.021 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Flow-based distribution networks Population games Nash equilibrium Cooperative games Shapley value Dynamic resource allocation Partitioning approach Distributed control |
| Sumario: | This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems. |
|---|