Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions

We develop new transaction management (TRM) proxies, to find empirical evidence of the strategic management of accounting transactions, aiming to carry out money laundering activities, within a sample of 355 firms controlled by Italian Mafias. Our results reveal that, using a cluster analysis, Mafia...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Ravenda, Diego, Valencia Silva, Maika, Argilés Bosch, Josep M., García Blandón, Josep
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/132582
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/132582
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Blanqueig de diners
Màfia
Frau fiscal
Itàlia
Money laundering
Mafia
Tax evasion
Italy
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spelling Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactionsRavenda, DiegoValencia Silva, MaikaArgilés Bosch, Josep M.García Blandón, JosepBlanqueig de dinersMàfiaFrau fiscalItàliaMoney launderingMafiaTax evasionItalyWe develop new transaction management (TRM) proxies, to find empirical evidence of the strategic management of accounting transactions, aiming to carry out money laundering activities, within a sample of 355 firms controlled by Italian Mafias. Our results reveal that, using a cluster analysis, Mafia-controlled firms can be classified into two different groups corresponding to real firms and shell firms, based on specific assumptions on their distinctive peculiarities. Importantly, our regression estimations provide evidence of different TRM practices of these firms, which may be linked to specific money laundering activities. Finally, the seizure of Mafia-controlled firms and their assignment to legal administrators only have a significant impact on TRM within Mafia-controlled shell firms, whereas the null impact on TRM, within Mafia-controlled real firms, casts doubt on the ability of legal administrators to completely deter money laundering. This study proposes new TRM proxies, based on the nature of the expenditure transaction, which could be used by authorities as accounting red flags of money laundering activities. Furthermore, this study may support critical arguments against the orthodox view of the anti-money laundering role of accounting and the suitability of traditional TRM proxies to depict practices within firms sharing common traits with Mafia-controlled firms. Indeed, these firms may engage in TRM for illicit and/or opportunistic purposes, when the external scrutiny is weak, their financial statements are irrelevant for trading with stakeholders, because of competitive advantages or dominant market positions, and they can count on colluded actors as counterparties of money laundering transactions.Elsevier2019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/132582Articles publicats en revistes (Empresa)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.08.003Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2019, vol. 60, num. May, p. 65-85https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.08.003cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2019http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1325822026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
title Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
spellingShingle Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
Ravenda, Diego
Blanqueig de diners
Màfia
Frau fiscal
Itàlia
Money laundering
Mafia
Tax evasion
Italy
title_short Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
title_full Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
title_fullStr Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
title_full_unstemmed Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
title_sort Money laundering through the strategic management of accounting transactions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ravenda, Diego
Valencia Silva, Maika
Argilés Bosch, Josep M.
García Blandón, Josep
author Ravenda, Diego
author_facet Ravenda, Diego
Valencia Silva, Maika
Argilés Bosch, Josep M.
García Blandón, Josep
author_role author
author2 Valencia Silva, Maika
Argilés Bosch, Josep M.
García Blandón, Josep
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Blanqueig de diners
Màfia
Frau fiscal
Itàlia
Money laundering
Mafia
Tax evasion
Italy
topic Blanqueig de diners
Màfia
Frau fiscal
Itàlia
Money laundering
Mafia
Tax evasion
Italy
description We develop new transaction management (TRM) proxies, to find empirical evidence of the strategic management of accounting transactions, aiming to carry out money laundering activities, within a sample of 355 firms controlled by Italian Mafias. Our results reveal that, using a cluster analysis, Mafia-controlled firms can be classified into two different groups corresponding to real firms and shell firms, based on specific assumptions on their distinctive peculiarities. Importantly, our regression estimations provide evidence of different TRM practices of these firms, which may be linked to specific money laundering activities. Finally, the seizure of Mafia-controlled firms and their assignment to legal administrators only have a significant impact on TRM within Mafia-controlled shell firms, whereas the null impact on TRM, within Mafia-controlled real firms, casts doubt on the ability of legal administrators to completely deter money laundering. This study proposes new TRM proxies, based on the nature of the expenditure transaction, which could be used by authorities as accounting red flags of money laundering activities. Furthermore, this study may support critical arguments against the orthodox view of the anti-money laundering role of accounting and the suitability of traditional TRM proxies to depict practices within firms sharing common traits with Mafia-controlled firms. Indeed, these firms may engage in TRM for illicit and/or opportunistic purposes, when the external scrutiny is weak, their financial statements are irrelevant for trading with stakeholders, because of competitive advantages or dominant market positions, and they can count on colluded actors as counterparties of money laundering transactions.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/132582
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/132582
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.08.003
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2019, vol. 60, num. May, p. 65-85
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.08.003
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Empresa)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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