Monetary policy with private information: a role for monetary targets
This paper examines the optimal design of a set of legislative rules which balances credibility in monetary policy when the central banker has some private information. The main result is that the best legislative package should include a monetary target set by Congress, a targeting horizon consisti...
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| Tipo de recurso: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1993 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/64198 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64198 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Monetary policy Política monetaria Estructura económica |
| Sumario: | This paper examines the optimal design of a set of legislative rules which balances credibility in monetary policy when the central banker has some private information. The main result is that the best legislative package should include a monetary target set by Congress, a targeting horizon consisting of one period of time and a small punishment on the central banker if it deviates from the target. Moreover, it is shown that both the discretionary and the average targeting approaches to monetary policy are nested into our more comprehensive approach. |
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