Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms

We investigate the effects of an exogenous demand shock arising from the award of public service contracts by Italian public administrations in 2015 on a sample of 1782 winning small and medium firms that were not awarded any contract during the previous 3 years. Using a difference-in-differences mo...

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Autores: Ravenda, Diego, Valencia Silva, Maika, Argilés Bosch, Josep M., García Blandón, Josep
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/182986
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/182986
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Adjudicació de contractes
Serveis públics
Cotització a la seguretat social
Letting of contracts
Public utilities
Social security taxes
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spelling Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning FirmsRavenda, DiegoValencia Silva, MaikaArgilés Bosch, Josep M.García Blandón, JosepAdjudicació de contractesServeis públicsCotització a la seguretat socialLetting of contractsPublic utilitiesSocial security taxesWe investigate the effects of an exogenous demand shock arising from the award of public service contracts by Italian public administrations in 2015 on a sample of 1782 winning small and medium firms that were not awarded any contract during the previous 3 years. Using a difference-in-differences model with continuous treatments estimated on a propensity score matched sample, our results reveal that higher awarded values enhance various performance dimensions of the winning firms as well as their average payroll per employee. Nonetheless, higher winning rebates moderate the positive effects of the award on payroll by inducing the winning firms to downward manage both salaries and social security contributions per employee to maintain their desired level of performance. The effects are mostly significant for smaller microenterprises. In addition, winning rebates negatively affect the performance of firms in the construction industry by leading these firms to downward manage the payroll of their employees more aggressively than firms in other industries. Our findings provide novel insights for the implementation of industrial policies aimed at achieving sustainable macroeconomic and social goals, within the business fabric, through the effective management of public service procurement.Oxford University Press2022info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/182986Articles publicats en revistes (Empresa)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab067Industrial and Corporate Change, 2022, vol. 31, p. 186-214https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab067(c) Ravenda, Diego et al., 2022info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1829862026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
title Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
spellingShingle Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
Ravenda, Diego
Adjudicació de contractes
Serveis públics
Cotització a la seguretat social
Letting of contracts
Public utilities
Social security taxes
title_short Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
title_full Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
title_fullStr Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
title_full_unstemmed Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
title_sort Effects of the Award of Public Service Contracts on the Performance and Payroll of Winning Firms
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ravenda, Diego
Valencia Silva, Maika
Argilés Bosch, Josep M.
García Blandón, Josep
author Ravenda, Diego
author_facet Ravenda, Diego
Valencia Silva, Maika
Argilés Bosch, Josep M.
García Blandón, Josep
author_role author
author2 Valencia Silva, Maika
Argilés Bosch, Josep M.
García Blandón, Josep
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Adjudicació de contractes
Serveis públics
Cotització a la seguretat social
Letting of contracts
Public utilities
Social security taxes
topic Adjudicació de contractes
Serveis públics
Cotització a la seguretat social
Letting of contracts
Public utilities
Social security taxes
description We investigate the effects of an exogenous demand shock arising from the award of public service contracts by Italian public administrations in 2015 on a sample of 1782 winning small and medium firms that were not awarded any contract during the previous 3 years. Using a difference-in-differences model with continuous treatments estimated on a propensity score matched sample, our results reveal that higher awarded values enhance various performance dimensions of the winning firms as well as their average payroll per employee. Nonetheless, higher winning rebates moderate the positive effects of the award on payroll by inducing the winning firms to downward manage both salaries and social security contributions per employee to maintain their desired level of performance. The effects are mostly significant for smaller microenterprises. In addition, winning rebates negatively affect the performance of firms in the construction industry by leading these firms to downward manage the payroll of their employees more aggressively than firms in other industries. Our findings provide novel insights for the implementation of industrial policies aimed at achieving sustainable macroeconomic and social goals, within the business fabric, through the effective management of public service procurement.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/182986
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/182986
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab067
Industrial and Corporate Change, 2022, vol. 31, p. 186-214
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab067
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) Ravenda, Diego et al., 2022
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) Ravenda, Diego et al., 2022
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Empresa)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.300719

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