Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle

This article examines the application of the ought-implies-can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián Jesús
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Repositorio:Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/716493
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10486/716493
https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12417
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Ought Implies Can
Courts
Facebook
Derecho
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spelling Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principleFigueroa Rubio, Sebastián JesúsOught Implies CanCourtsFacebookDerechoThis article examines the application of the ought-implies-can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions show that the principle operates in two different but complementary ways: as part of prescriptive relations and as part of responsibility practicesWileyDepartamento de Derecho Público y Filosofía JurídicaFacultad de Derecho20242024-11-17research articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1VoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10486/716493https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12417reponame:Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAMinstname:Universidad Autónoma de MadridInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Attribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/7164932026-06-23T12:46:27Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
title Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
spellingShingle Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián Jesús
Ought Implies Can
Courts
Facebook
Derecho
title_short Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
title_full Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
title_fullStr Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
title_full_unstemmed Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
title_sort Interpreting action with norms: Responsibility and the twofold nature of the ought-implies-can principle
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián Jesús
author Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián Jesús
author_facet Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián Jesús
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Departamento de Derecho Público y Filosofía Jurídica
Facultad de Derecho
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ought Implies Can
Courts
Facebook
Derecho
topic Ought Implies Can
Courts
Facebook
Derecho
description This article examines the application of the ought-implies-can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions show that the principle operates in two different but complementary ways: as part of prescriptive relations and as part of responsibility practices
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
2024-11-17
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv research article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
VoR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10486/716493
https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12417
url http://hdl.handle.net/10486/716493
https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12417
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM
instname:Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
instname_str Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
reponame_str Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM
collection Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.811543

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