Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure

Cooperative games model situations in which a group of players work together to make a profit. Frequently, in cooperative situations there are dependency or hierarchical relationships between the players, which must be taken into account when allocating the common profit obtained by the grand coalit...

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Autores: Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos, Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel, Jiménez Losada, Andrés
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2024
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Sevilla (US)
Repositorio:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
OAI Identifier:oai:idus.us.es:11441/162234
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/11441/162234
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Cooperative games
Shapley value
Allocation rules
Permission structures
Hierarchical structures
Authorization structures
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spelling Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structureAlarcón Carrero, Antonio CarlosGallardo Morilla, José ManuelJiménez Losada, AndrésCooperative gamesShapley valueAllocation rulesPermission structuresHierarchical structuresAuthorization structuresCooperative games model situations in which a group of players work together to make a profit. Frequently, in cooperative situations there are dependency or hierarchical relationships between the players, which must be taken into account when allocating the common profit obtained by the grand coalition. Multiple structures have been used in the literature to model those relationships, and several values have been proposed, but there is something in common in all of them: if a player can veto the participation of another in any coalition, then both players will receive the same share of the profit derived from the active cooperation of the vetoed player. In other words, actively cooperating and giving permission to cooperate are equally valued. In many situations this is neither fair nor realistic. In this paper we introduce a family of allocation rules for cooperative games with authorization structure, which reward positional power less than active cooperation.SpringerMatemática Aplicada IIFQM237: Juegos con Estructuras Combinatorias y de OrdenMinisterio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (MICINN). España2024info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/11441/162234https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7reponame:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevillainstname:Universidad de Sevilla (US)InglésOR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management.PID2022-138956NB-I00https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:idus.us.es:11441/1622342026-06-17T12:51:07Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
title Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
spellingShingle Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos
Cooperative games
Shapley value
Allocation rules
Permission structures
Hierarchical structures
Authorization structures
title_short Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
title_full Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
title_fullStr Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
title_full_unstemmed Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
title_sort Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos
Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel
Jiménez Losada, Andrés
author Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos
author_facet Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos
Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel
Jiménez Losada, Andrés
author_role author
author2 Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel
Jiménez Losada, Andrés
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Matemática Aplicada II
FQM237: Juegos con Estructuras Combinatorias y de Orden
Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (MICINN). España
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Cooperative games
Shapley value
Allocation rules
Permission structures
Hierarchical structures
Authorization structures
topic Cooperative games
Shapley value
Allocation rules
Permission structures
Hierarchical structures
Authorization structures
description Cooperative games model situations in which a group of players work together to make a profit. Frequently, in cooperative situations there are dependency or hierarchical relationships between the players, which must be taken into account when allocating the common profit obtained by the grand coalition. Multiple structures have been used in the literature to model those relationships, and several values have been proposed, but there is something in common in all of them: if a player can veto the participation of another in any coalition, then both players will receive the same share of the profit derived from the active cooperation of the vetoed player. In other words, actively cooperating and giving permission to cooperate are equally valued. In many situations this is neither fair nor realistic. In this paper we introduce a family of allocation rules for cooperative games with authorization structure, which reward positional power less than active cooperation.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/11441/162234
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7
url https://hdl.handle.net/11441/162234
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management.
PID2022-138956NB-I00
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
instname:Universidad de Sevilla (US)
instname_str Universidad de Sevilla (US)
reponame_str idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
collection idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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