Grounding Legal Reality
[eng] The four main chapters of this thesis, while each largely autonomous, collectively provide a study of the relation between grounding and supervenience, and a comprehensive application of grounding theory to the philosophy of law. Chapter 1 argues that a supervenience relation interestingly wea...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/135404 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/135404 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/667056 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Metafísica Filosofia del dret Positivisme jurídic Metaphysics Philosophy of law Legal positivism |
| Sumario: | [eng] The four main chapters of this thesis, while each largely autonomous, collectively provide a study of the relation between grounding and supervenience, and a comprehensive application of grounding theory to the philosophy of law. Chapter 1 argues that a supervenience relation interestingly weaker than necessitation can be used to capture a substantive connection between grounding and modality. Chapter 2 argues that metaphysical grounding is the relation of dependence that connects legal facts to their determinants, and that the positivism/anti-positivism debate in legal philosophy involves competing claims on the grounds of legal facts. Chapter 3 criticizes extant grounding- based formulations of legal positivism offered by Rosen (2010) and Plunkett and Shapiro (2017), and puts forward a novel and insightful formulation that is capable of solving their problems, which crucially relies on the notion of a social enabler. Finally, Chapter 4 shows that Hume’s Law – the thesis that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ – poses no significant threat to legal positivism or moral naturalism, both understood as views about grounding. |
|---|