On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove t...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:174228 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/174228 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Assignment game Core Set-wise stability Competitive equilibrium |
| Sumario: | We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Second, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff. |
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