Legal disagreements and new theories of reference

According to Hartian positivists, law is a conventional practice that requires a convergence that includes not only the regularity of behavior but also of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is easy to conclude that in this framework the meaning of terms is determined by shared criteria that are trans...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
Formato: capítulo de livro
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Recursos:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/72294
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:New theories of reference
Descriptivism
Interpretive disagreements
Hart
Dworkin
Positivism
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spelling Legal disagreements and new theories of referenceRamírez-Ludeña, LorenaNew theories of referenceDescriptivismInterpretive disagreementsHartDworkinPositivismAccording to Hartian positivists, law is a conventional practice that requires a convergence that includes not only the regularity of behavior but also of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is easy to conclude that in this framework the meaning of terms is determined by shared criteria that are transparent to all parties, a form of semantic descriptivism. This, at least, is the way in which Dworkin and his followers have interpreted Hart's positivist stance. The problem is that disagreements often arise on how to interpret the words of the law, and this fact seems to conflict with the emphasis of positivism on the idea of agreement, or so it is argued. If the meaning of legal terms depends on shared criteria, why do individuals disagree? And if they disagree, what does their disagreement consist in? The discussion about how to account for interpretive disagreement can be seen as a discussion about how to account for the meaning of terms, and hence as a discussion about what kind of theory of meaning explains the existence of disagreement and the grounds for its resolution. In some cases a descriptivist approach to semantics seems to be correct, whereas other cases seem to speak in favor of non-descriptivist theories of reference. In this work we will examine critically how two competing approaches to meaning account for disagreements. We will argue that Hart's conventionalist stance does not commit him to descriptivism. That non-descriptivist theories of reference, properly understood, can account for a vast array of cases of interpretive disagreement; that an account of different kinds of disagreement can be provided from a conventionalist perspective within the framework of non-descriptivist theories of reference, and hence that the dispute between Dworkinians and Hartians does not depend on Hart's commitment to one or another semantic theory. We argue that both in and out of the legal context, a host of non-semantic considerations have to be taken into account in the adjudication of disputes.SpringerNature2026202620162026info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPartinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésCapone, Alessandro; Poggi, Francesca (eds.). Pragmatics and Law. Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer; 2016. p. 121-139. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6© SpringerNature This is a author's accepted manuscript of: Martí G, Ramírez-Ludeña L. Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference. In: Capone A, Poggi F, editors. Pragmatics and Law. Cham: Springer; 2016. p. 121-139. (Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol. 7). The final version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/722942026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
title Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
spellingShingle Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
New theories of reference
Descriptivism
Interpretive disagreements
Hart
Dworkin
Positivism
title_short Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
title_full Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
title_fullStr Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
title_full_unstemmed Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
title_sort Legal disagreements and new theories of reference
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
author Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
author_facet Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv New theories of reference
Descriptivism
Interpretive disagreements
Hart
Dworkin
Positivism
topic New theories of reference
Descriptivism
Interpretive disagreements
Hart
Dworkin
Positivism
description According to Hartian positivists, law is a conventional practice that requires a convergence that includes not only the regularity of behavior but also of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is easy to conclude that in this framework the meaning of terms is determined by shared criteria that are transparent to all parties, a form of semantic descriptivism. This, at least, is the way in which Dworkin and his followers have interpreted Hart's positivist stance. The problem is that disagreements often arise on how to interpret the words of the law, and this fact seems to conflict with the emphasis of positivism on the idea of agreement, or so it is argued. If the meaning of legal terms depends on shared criteria, why do individuals disagree? And if they disagree, what does their disagreement consist in? The discussion about how to account for interpretive disagreement can be seen as a discussion about how to account for the meaning of terms, and hence as a discussion about what kind of theory of meaning explains the existence of disagreement and the grounds for its resolution. In some cases a descriptivist approach to semantics seems to be correct, whereas other cases seem to speak in favor of non-descriptivist theories of reference. In this work we will examine critically how two competing approaches to meaning account for disagreements. We will argue that Hart's conventionalist stance does not commit him to descriptivism. That non-descriptivist theories of reference, properly understood, can account for a vast array of cases of interpretive disagreement; that an account of different kinds of disagreement can be provided from a conventionalist perspective within the framework of non-descriptivist theories of reference, and hence that the dispute between Dworkinians and Hartians does not depend on Hart's commitment to one or another semantic theory. We argue that both in and out of the legal context, a host of non-semantic considerations have to be taken into account in the adjudication of disputes.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
2026
2026
2026
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format bookPart
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294
url https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72294
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Capone, Alessandro; Poggi, Francesca (eds.). Pragmatics and Law. Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer; 2016. p. 121-139. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-30385-7_6
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv SpringerNature
publisher.none.fl_str_mv SpringerNature
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
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