Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence

This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Curto Grau, Marta, Zudenkova, Galina
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/124367
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/124367
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Partits polítics
Política de despeses públiques
Disciplina de partit
Political parties
Government spending policy
Party discipline
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spelling Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidenceCurto Grau, MartaZudenkova, GalinaPartits políticsPolítica de despeses públiquesDisciplina de partitPolitical partiesGovernment spending policyParty disciplineThis paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. This effect is greater the more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests. Using data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal payments to congressional districts between 1986 and 2010, we provide evidence that increases in legislators' party discipline raise the amounts of discretionary spending their districts receive. The rewards for discipline are larger the greater the gap between the constituents' and party's preferences (i.e., in conservative-leaning districts represented by Democrats or liberal-leaning districts represented by Republicans).Elsevier B.V.2018info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/124367Articles publicats en revistes (Història Econòmica, Institucions, Política i Economia Mundial)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.008Journal of Public Economics, 2018, vol. 164, p. 139-152https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.008info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/749547cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1243672026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
title Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
spellingShingle Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
Curto Grau, Marta
Partits polítics
Política de despeses públiques
Disciplina de partit
Political parties
Government spending policy
Party discipline
title_short Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
title_full Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
title_fullStr Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
title_full_unstemmed Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
title_sort Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Curto Grau, Marta
Zudenkova, Galina
author Curto Grau, Marta
author_facet Curto Grau, Marta
Zudenkova, Galina
author_role author
author2 Zudenkova, Galina
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Partits polítics
Política de despeses públiques
Disciplina de partit
Political parties
Government spending policy
Party discipline
topic Partits polítics
Política de despeses públiques
Disciplina de partit
Political parties
Government spending policy
Party discipline
description This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. This effect is greater the more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests. Using data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal payments to congressional districts between 1986 and 2010, we provide evidence that increases in legislators' party discipline raise the amounts of discretionary spending their districts receive. The rewards for discipline are larger the greater the gap between the constituents' and party's preferences (i.e., in conservative-leaning districts represented by Democrats or liberal-leaning districts represented by Republicans).
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/124367
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/124367
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.008
Journal of Public Economics, 2018, vol. 164, p. 139-152
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.008
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/749547
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Història Econòmica, Institucions, Política i Economia Mundial)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,300719

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