On deontic truth and values

This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended byAlchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestiveconception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalentto thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they def...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Moreso, Josep Joan
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/59575
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59575
http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Alchourrón-bulygin
Ethical relativism
Ethical constructivism
Burdenof proof
Particularism
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spelling On deontic truth and valuesMoreso, Josep JoanAlchourrón-bulyginEthical relativismEthical constructivismBurdenof proofParticularismThis article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended byAlchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestiveconception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalentto thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativistconception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts ofethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of theproof; b) aversion of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. Thisarticle presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show thatthey are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in thenormative sphere.202420242017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/59575http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésCrítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía. 2017 Oct 31;49(146):61-74Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía by Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional License.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/595752026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On deontic truth and values
title On deontic truth and values
spellingShingle On deontic truth and values
Moreso, Josep Joan
Alchourrón-bulygin
Ethical relativism
Ethical constructivism
Burdenof proof
Particularism
title_short On deontic truth and values
title_full On deontic truth and values
title_fullStr On deontic truth and values
title_full_unstemmed On deontic truth and values
title_sort On deontic truth and values
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Moreso, Josep Joan
author Moreso, Josep Joan
author_facet Moreso, Josep Joan
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Alchourrón-bulygin
Ethical relativism
Ethical constructivism
Burdenof proof
Particularism
topic Alchourrón-bulygin
Ethical relativism
Ethical constructivism
Burdenof proof
Particularism
description This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended byAlchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestiveconception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalentto thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativistconception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts ofethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of theproof; b) aversion of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. Thisarticle presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show thatthey are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in thenormative sphere.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59575
http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181
url http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59575
http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía. 2017 Oct 31;49(146):61-74
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
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