Power indices and minimal winning coalitions for simple games in partition function form
We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity property that we define in this context. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on such coalitions. F...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/116785 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116785 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Teoria de jocs Teoria de l'estimació Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Presa de decisions (Estadística) Game theory Estimation theory Cooperative games (Mathematics) Statistical decision |
| Sumario: | We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity property that we define in this context. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on such coalitions. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the Parliament of Andalusia that emerged after the elections of March 22, 2015. |
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