Enhancing the insertion of NOP instructions to obfuscate malware via deep reinforcement learning

Current state-of-the-art research for tackling the problem of malware detection and classification is centered on the design, implementation and deployment of systems powered by machine learning because of its ability to generalize to never-before-seen malware families and polymorphic mutations. How...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Gibert Llauradó, Daniel, Fredrikson, Matt, Mateu Piñol, Carles, Planes Cid, Jordi
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión enviada para evaluación y publicación
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10459.1/72778
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2021.102543
http://hdl.handle.net/10459.1/72778
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Malware Classification
Assembly Language Source Code
Obfuscation
Reinforcement Learning
Deep Q-Network
Descripción
Sumario:Current state-of-the-art research for tackling the problem of malware detection and classification is centered on the design, implementation and deployment of systems powered by machine learning because of its ability to generalize to never-before-seen malware families and polymorphic mutations. However, it has been shown that machine learning models, in partidular deep neural networks, lack robustness against crafted inputs (adversarial examples). In this work, we have investigated the vulnerability of a state-of-the-art shallow convolutional neural network malware classifier against the deat code insertion technique. We propose a general framework powered by a Double Q-network to induce misclassification over malware families. The framework trains an agent through a convolutional neural network to select the optimal positions in a code sequence to insert dead code instructions so that the machine learning classifier mislabels the resulting executable. The experiments show that the proposed method significantly drops the classification accuracy of the classifier to 56.53% while having an evasion rate of 100% for the samples belonging to Kelihos_ver3, Simda, and Kelihos_ver1 families. In addition, the average number of instructions needed to mislabel malware in comparison to a random agent decreased by 33%.