Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium

In a two-population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individuals belonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs. Agents play a game against individuals in the two populations. They imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative popula...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Cabo García, Francisco José, García González, Ana
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión borrador
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Valladolid
Repositorio:UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
OAI Identifier:oai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/51703
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.002
https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51703
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica
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spelling Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibriumCabo García, Francisco JoséGarcía González, Ana1207.06 Teoría de Juegos5307.15 Teoría MicroeconómicaIn a two-population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individuals belonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs. Agents play a game against individuals in the two populations. They imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative population. When a revising agent is matched with an individual in the alternative population who plays differently, his expected payoff and the observed payoff of his partner diverge. Hence, he conjectures the payoff from switching to the other strategy by weighing what he expected and what he observes. The evolutionary dynamics has a unique asymptotically stable fixed point, which typically differs from the evolutionary stable equilibrium without inter-population imitation. For a collective action game we analyze to what extent the compliance rate and the social welfare differ from the Nash equilibrium, and how these gaps depend on the confidence that agents assign to what they see.This study was funded by the Spanish Government (projects ECO2014-52343-P and ECO2017-82227-P), as well as financial aid from Junta de Castilla y León (projects VA024P17 and VA105G18), co-financed by FEDER funds.Elsevier2020info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draftapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.002https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51703reponame:UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolidinstname:Universidad de ValladolidEspañolhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268120303309info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:uvadoc.uva.es:10324/517032026-06-13T12:44:47Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
title Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
spellingShingle Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
Cabo García, Francisco José
1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica
title_short Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
title_full Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
title_fullStr Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
title_full_unstemmed Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
title_sort Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cabo García, Francisco José
García González, Ana
author Cabo García, Francisco José
author_facet Cabo García, Francisco José
García González, Ana
author_role author
author2 García González, Ana
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica
topic 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica
description In a two-population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individuals belonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs. Agents play a game against individuals in the two populations. They imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative population. When a revising agent is matched with an individual in the alternative population who plays differently, his expected payoff and the observed payoff of his partner diverge. Hence, he conjectures the payoff from switching to the other strategy by weighing what he expected and what he observes. The evolutionary dynamics has a unique asymptotically stable fixed point, which typically differs from the evolutionary stable equilibrium without inter-population imitation. For a collective action game we analyze to what extent the compliance rate and the social welfare differ from the Nash equilibrium, and how these gaps depend on the confidence that agents assign to what they see.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/draft
format article
status_str draft
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.002
https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51703
url https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.002
https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51703
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Español
language_invalid_str_mv Español
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268120303309
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
instname:Universidad de Valladolid
instname_str Universidad de Valladolid
reponame_str UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
collection UVaDOC. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Valladolid
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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