Modelling the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. Hyperintensional accounts of justification, knowledge, and epistemic possibility
[eng] Standard epistemic logic, assuming logical omniscience, models agents with highly idealized cognitive capacities. This dissertation explores and proposes different frameworks to model agents whose cognitive capacities are less idealized, and thus more similar to our own. Chapter 1 examines a n...
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| Format: | doctoral thesis |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2025 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/221505 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/221505 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/694630 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Lògica Cognició Justificació (Teoria del coneixement) Possibilitat Logic Cognition Justification (Theory of Knowledge) Possibility |
| Summary: | [eng] Standard epistemic logic, assuming logical omniscience, models agents with highly idealized cognitive capacities. This dissertation explores and proposes different frameworks to model agents whose cognitive capacities are less idealized, and thus more similar to our own. Chapter 1 examines a non-normal epistemic logic developed by Sven Rosenkranz. I analyze the formal semantics he proposes and show how it successfully invalidates certain undesirable principles for knowledge and being in a position to know. While the neighborhood semantics he employs reduces some of the most extreme idealizations, it remains too coarse-grained, treating sentences with the same intension—i.e., those true in the same set of possible worlds—as expressing the same proposition. The rest of the dissertation adopts hyperintensional semantics, which allows for finer distinctions. Chapter 2 develops a hyperintensional account of epistemic possibility and applies it to Stalnaker’s conception of belief as the epistemic possibility of knowledge. This mirrors Rosenkranz’s treatment of epistemic justification as the epistemic possibility of being in a position to know. The approach is flexible and compatible with various hyperintensional frameworks, with a particular focus on awareness-based and topic-sensitive semantics. Chapter 3, inspired by work on logical grounding, proposes a refinement of topic-sensitive semantics and introduces a hyperintensional notion of epistemic justification. Finally, Chapter 4 raises a challenge for topic-sensitive semantics, arguing that it misrepresents certain scenarios by making knowledge more easily attainable than it actually is. This critique highlights potential limitations of the framework and suggests directions for further refinement. |
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