Honesty in Environmental Regulation
This paper analyzes the determination of the optimal environmental regulatory policy under imperfect competition when the firms differ in their polluting technologies and degree of honesty. We show that more honesty does not necessarily imply lower social losses. The effect of honesty in social welf...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2003 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de La Rioja (UR) |
| Repositorio: | RIUR. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de La Rioja |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.dialnet.es:doc/5bbc6879b750603269e80987 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://investigacion.unirioja.es/documentos/5bbc6879b750603269e80987 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Sumario: | This paper analyzes the determination of the optimal environmental regulatory policy under imperfect competition when the firms differ in their polluting technologies and degree of honesty. We show that more honesty does not necessarily imply lower social losses. The effect of honesty in social welfare depends not only on the degree of honesty measured by the proportion of honest firms and their particular cost features but also on the industry structure. |
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