PALANTIR: Zero-Trust Architecture for Managed Security Service Provider
The H2020 PALANTIR project aims at delivering a Security-as-a-Service solution to SMEs and microenterprises via the exploitation of containerised Network Functions. However, these functions are conceived by third-party developers and can also be deployed in untrustworthy virtualisation layers, depen...
| Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2023 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2072/531514 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/2072/531514 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Cibersecurity Security 621.3 |
| Summary: | The H2020 PALANTIR project aims at delivering a Security-as-a-Service solution to SMEs and microenterprises via the exploitation of containerised Network Functions. However, these functions are conceived by third-party developers and can also be deployed in untrustworthy virtualisation layers, depending on the subscribed delivery model. Therefore, they cannot be trusted and require a stringent monitoring to ensure their harmlessness, as well as adequate measures to remediate any nefarious activities. This paper justifies, details and evaluates a Zero-Trust architecture supporting PALANTIR’s solution. Specifically, PALANTIR periodically attests the service and infrastructure’s components for signs of compromise by implementing the Trusted Computing paradigm. Verification addresses the firmware, OS and software using UEFI measured boot and Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture, extended to support containerised application attestation. Mitigation actions are supervised by the Recovery Service and the Security Orchestrator based on OSM to, respectively, determine the adequate remediation actions from a recovery policy and enforce them down to the lower layers of the infrastructure through local authenticated enablers. We detail an implementation prototype serving a baseline for quantitative evaluation of our work. |
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