La question métaphysique de l’identité d’un point de vue aristotélicien : L’hylémorphisme (d’Aristote), l’ADN (de Berti) et l’essence (de Lowe)

Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Pérez, A. (Alejandro)|||/items/4c41980f-dd36-496f-9bb9-6d6e199d6709
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:francés
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/42188
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/42188
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Berti
Lowe
Hylemorphism
Essence
Form
Descripción
Sumario:Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of form, thesis which raises many questions from an exegetical point of view and a metaphysical perspective. We will present the sources of Berti’s reading and one of the main objections made by Aristotle. Thus, different versions of the Berti’s thesis will be examined and then, a thought experiment that makes them false. Finally, it will be proposed an aristotelian solution, coming from a contemporary Aristotelian (E. J. Lowe), that seems to prevent Berti’s mistakes and gives us a robust metaphysics of the identity.