Ensuring Quality Provision through Capacity Regulation under Price Competition
We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulator wishes to ensure entry while avoiding strategic quality underprovision, regulating the incumbent's capacity is preferable to imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" on products. In ord...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2010 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/24784 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/24784 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Competència econòmica Competition Duopolis |
| Sumario: | We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulator wishes to ensure entry while avoiding strategic quality underprovision, regulating the incumbent's capacity is preferable to imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" on products. In order to establish this result, we make an original contribution to the study of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in a market with differentiated products |
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