The Quasi-Persuasive Nature of Disagreement
[eng] This thesis is made up of two papers. Both of them are concerned with the “motive for altering or calling into question the attitude of the other” that Stevenson included in his characterization of disagreement. The first paper argues that Eriksson’s considerations are insufficient for drawing...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/186925 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/186925 http://hdl.handle.net/10803/674616 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Cognició Persuasió (Psicologia) Criteri Raonament Cognition Persuasion (Psychology) Judgment Reasoning |
| Sumario: | [eng] This thesis is made up of two papers. Both of them are concerned with the “motive for altering or calling into question the attitude of the other” that Stevenson included in his characterization of disagreement. The first paper argues that Eriksson’s considerations are insufficient for drawing the conclusion that moral and taste judgments are different with respect to the presence of such a motive. The second paper offers an account of what it is to have disagreement in terms of “demanding” agreement, by developing the Stevensonian “calling into question” element. |
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