Juicio, ley y aplicación en Kant. Un problema central de La crítica de la facultad de juzgar
In this article I study Kant's doctrine of the power of judgement (aesthetic and theological). I focus on its main function of rendering possible the transition from the lawfulness of nature to the realization of practical ends. In order to do so, I analyze the concept of “spontaneity” and the...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2007 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/22303 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/22303 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Kant, Immanuel Ley Juicio Aplicación |
| Sumario: | In this article I study Kant's doctrine of the power of judgement (aesthetic and theological). I focus on its main function of rendering possible the transition from the lawfulness of nature to the realization of practical ends. In order to do so, I analyze the concept of “spontaneity” and the principle of “purposiveness of nature”, understood as a “principle of contingency”, according to Kant's explanation in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. |
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