Post-quantum cryptography acceleration for next generation computers
(English) The security of modern cryptographic schemes relies upon mathematical problems that are assumed to be hard to solve, like the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) problem or the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. Using the existing “classical” computers, all known algorithms attemptin...
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| Tipo de recurso: | tesis doctoral |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | CBUC, CESCA |
| Repositorio: | TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.tdx.cat:10803/695219 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10803/695219 https://dx.doi.org/10.5821/dissertation-2117-441612 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica 004 - Informàtica |
| Sumario: | (English) The security of modern cryptographic schemes relies upon mathematical problems that are assumed to be hard to solve, like the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) problem or the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. Using the existing “classical” computers, all known algorithms attempting to solve these problems, would require such a big amount of computational time that will actually make the intercepted data useless by the time the attack finishes. Around 1997, Shor and Grover independently developed efficient quantum-computer algorithms that can give unprecedented speedup on certain mathematical problems. It then became evident that the advent of a large scale quantum computer can jeopardize secure communications. Nevertheless, it is still not clear whether there will exist large scale quantum computers able to break the current public key cryptographic standards. As a preemptive act, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced in 2015 its plans for transitioning to Post-Quantum (PQ) cryptographic algorithmic standards. The widespread adoption of the current standards , calls for further research on the efficiency and security of the PQ standards implementation on modern computing systems. This thesis intends to bridge the gap between the PQ cryptosystems’secure specification and their respectively secure and efficient implementation in advanced computing architectures.We specifically choose the PQ cryptosystem of Classic McEliece (CM), merely due to its long-standing security. CM has withstood attacks with minor modifications since its inception in 1978 and is currently a finalist of the NIST contest and has already been integrated in commercial products like VPN networks. This thesis comprises four main contributions. In the first one we present a hardware/software (HW/SW) co-design acceleration of the CM cryptosystem. The second contribution is geared towards the design and integration of custom designed and monolithic CM accelerators in a RISC-V based SoC. The third contribution strives to further optimize the performance of CM in hardware by introducing an advanced design of a monolithic accelerator for the encryption part of the CM cryptosystem. The final contribution of this thesis is moving away from a monolithic hardware accelerator and investigates the impact of vectorization by an SIMD unit on the CM application. With this thesis, we conclude a study conveyed on the CM cryptosystem, concerning its efficient hardware implementation on modern computing infrastructures. Nevertheless, there are numerous future research directions that could build on the knowledge gained as well as the hardware infrastructure designed in the context of this thesis. As such, we consider the secure implementation and side-channel mitigation on the CM hardware accelerators themselves and the performance evaluation of lightweight hardware implementations of CM. |
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