Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in t...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2007 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:143508 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143508 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Matching market Incomplete information Singleton Core |
| Sumario: | We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences |
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