Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence

We examine the contribution of analyst forecasting accuracy in reducing the average total cost of debt to firms. Our results reinforce the importance of analyst accuracy as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries in the market, which is important to increase firms' access to availa...

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Autores: Ferrer Zubiate, Elena, Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael, Suárez Suárez, Nuria
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:Universidad Pública de Navarra
Repositorio:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
OAI Identifier:oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/36993
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2454/36993
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Cost of debt
Analyst accuracy
Internal governance mechanisms
External governance mechanisms
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spelling Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidenceFerrer Zubiate, ElenaSantamaría Aquilué, RafaelSuárez Suárez, NuriaCost of debtAnalyst accuracyInternal governance mechanismsExternal governance mechanismsWe examine the contribution of analyst forecasting accuracy in reducing the average total cost of debt to firms. Our results reinforce the importance of analyst accuracy as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries in the market, which is important to increase firms' access to available investment funding. A significant level of institutional and bank-held ownership serves as a substitution mechanism which mitigates the capacity of analyst accuracy to reduce information risk. External governance mechanisms also moderate the role played by analyst accuracy in the reduction of the cost of corporate debt. Our empirical findings are robust to different model specifications including the potential effect of the legal origin, to the consideration of an alternative proxy for the total cost of debt, to the inclusion of additional analyst-characteristics and stock-level characteristics.Elena Ferrer is grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Project ECO2016-77631-R and Fundacion Bancaria Caja Navarra. Nuria Suárez acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Project ECO2016-79693-P, and the Comunidad de Madrid Project S2015/HUM-3353.ElsevierEnpresen KudeaketaInstitute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEGestión de Empresas2019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2454/36993reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarrainstname:Universidad Pública de NavarraInglésinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2016-77631-Rinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2016-79693-P© 2019 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/369932026-06-17T12:41:47Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
title Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
spellingShingle Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
Ferrer Zubiate, Elena
Cost of debt
Analyst accuracy
Internal governance mechanisms
External governance mechanisms
title_short Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
title_full Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
title_fullStr Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
title_full_unstemmed Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
title_sort Does analyst information influence the cost of debt? Some international evidence
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ferrer Zubiate, Elena
Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael
Suárez Suárez, Nuria
author Ferrer Zubiate, Elena
author_facet Ferrer Zubiate, Elena
Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael
Suárez Suárez, Nuria
author_role author
author2 Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael
Suárez Suárez, Nuria
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Enpresen Kudeaketa
Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
Gestión de Empresas
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Cost of debt
Analyst accuracy
Internal governance mechanisms
External governance mechanisms
topic Cost of debt
Analyst accuracy
Internal governance mechanisms
External governance mechanisms
description We examine the contribution of analyst forecasting accuracy in reducing the average total cost of debt to firms. Our results reinforce the importance of analyst accuracy as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries in the market, which is important to increase firms' access to available investment funding. A significant level of institutional and bank-held ownership serves as a substitution mechanism which mitigates the capacity of analyst accuracy to reduce information risk. External governance mechanisms also moderate the role played by analyst accuracy in the reduction of the cost of corporate debt. Our empirical findings are robust to different model specifications including the potential effect of the legal origin, to the consideration of an alternative proxy for the total cost of debt, to the inclusion of additional analyst-characteristics and stock-level characteristics.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2454/36993
url https://hdl.handle.net/2454/36993
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2016-77631-R
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2016-79693-P
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © 2019 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © 2019 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname:Universidad Pública de Navarra
instname_str Universidad Pública de Navarra
reponame_str Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
collection Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra
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