Detection of replay attacks in cyber-physical systems using a frequency-based signature
This paper proposes a frequency-based approach for the detection of replay attacks affecting cyber-physical systems (CPS). In particular, the method employs a sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency (authentication signal) into the closed-loop system and checks whether the time profile of th...
| Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Publication Date: | 2019 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repository: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/177795 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/177795 https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2019.01.005 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Cyber-physical systems cyber-attacks replay attacks signal generator detector logic Classificació INSPEC::Cybernetics Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica::Automàtica i control |
| Summary: | This paper proposes a frequency-based approach for the detection of replay attacks affecting cyber-physical systems (CPS). In particular, the method employs a sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency (authentication signal) into the closed-loop system and checks whether the time profile of the frequency components in the output signal are compatible with the authentication signal or not. In order to carry out this target, the couplings between inputs and outputs are eliminated using a dynamic decoupling technique based on vector fitting. In this way, a signature introduced on a specific input channel will affect only the output that is selected to be associated with that input, which is a property that can be exploited to determine which channels are being affected. A bank of band-pass filters is used to generate signals whose energies can be compared to reconstruct an estimation of the time-varying frequency profile. By matching the known frequency profile with its estimation, the detector can provide the information about whether a replay attack is being carried out or not. The design of the signal generator and the detector are thoroughly discussed, and an example based on a quadruple-tank process is used to show the application and effectiveness of the proposed method. |
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