Conventions and Constitutive Norms

The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: García-Carpintero, Manuel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/144633
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/144633
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Filosofia del llenguatge
Actes de parla (Lingüística)
Convenció (Filosofia)
Veritat
Norma (Filosofia)
Philosophy of language
Speech acts (Linguistics)
Convention (Philosophy)
Truth
Norm (Philosophy)
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spelling Conventions and Constitutive NormsGarcía-Carpintero, ManuelFilosofia del llenguatgeActes de parla (Lingüística)Convenció (Filosofia)VeritatNorma (Filosofia)Philosophy of languageSpeech acts (Linguistics)Convention (Philosophy)TruthNorm (Philosophy)The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The paper argues that this line of reasoning fails to establish any modal asymmetry, by invoking the distinction between the non-discriminating existence across possible worlds of types ('blueprints', as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and the discriminating existence of those among them that are actually in force, and hence truly normative. The necessity of practices defined by constitutive rules that the argument relies on concerns the former, while conventionalist claims are only about the latter. The paper should thus contribute to get a better understanding of what social constructs conceived as defined by constitutive norms are. It concludes by suggesting considerations that are relevant to deciding whether assertion is in fact conventional.De Gruyter2019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/144633Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0013Journal of Social Ontology, 2019https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0013cc-by-nc-nd (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2019http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1446332026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Conventions and Constitutive Norms
title Conventions and Constitutive Norms
spellingShingle Conventions and Constitutive Norms
García-Carpintero, Manuel
Filosofia del llenguatge
Actes de parla (Lingüística)
Convenció (Filosofia)
Veritat
Norma (Filosofia)
Philosophy of language
Speech acts (Linguistics)
Convention (Philosophy)
Truth
Norm (Philosophy)
title_short Conventions and Constitutive Norms
title_full Conventions and Constitutive Norms
title_fullStr Conventions and Constitutive Norms
title_full_unstemmed Conventions and Constitutive Norms
title_sort Conventions and Constitutive Norms
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv García-Carpintero, Manuel
author García-Carpintero, Manuel
author_facet García-Carpintero, Manuel
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Filosofia del llenguatge
Actes de parla (Lingüística)
Convenció (Filosofia)
Veritat
Norma (Filosofia)
Philosophy of language
Speech acts (Linguistics)
Convention (Philosophy)
Truth
Norm (Philosophy)
topic Filosofia del llenguatge
Actes de parla (Lingüística)
Convenció (Filosofia)
Veritat
Norma (Filosofia)
Philosophy of language
Speech acts (Linguistics)
Convention (Philosophy)
Truth
Norm (Philosophy)
description The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The paper argues that this line of reasoning fails to establish any modal asymmetry, by invoking the distinction between the non-discriminating existence across possible worlds of types ('blueprints', as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and the discriminating existence of those among them that are actually in force, and hence truly normative. The necessity of practices defined by constitutive rules that the argument relies on concerns the former, while conventionalist claims are only about the latter. The paper should thus contribute to get a better understanding of what social constructs conceived as defined by constitutive norms are. It concludes by suggesting considerations that are relevant to deciding whether assertion is in fact conventional.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/144633
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/144633
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0013
Journal of Social Ontology, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0013
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2019
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv De Gruyter
publisher.none.fl_str_mv De Gruyter
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.301629

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