When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements

New CEO appointments can create strategic uncertainty for stakeholders, potentially undermining the CEO's position. While the stakeholder uncertainty perspective suggests CEOs may act boldly to clarify their strategic intentions during early tenure, the CEO life cycle perspective proposes that...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Betschinger, Marie-Ann, Moschieri, Caterina, Bertrand, Olivier, Aidli, Mahmoud
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Institución:IE
Repositorio:Repositorio IE
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/4243
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.13267
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4243
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.13267
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:53 Ciencias Económicas::5311 Organización y dirección de empresas
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
acquisition hazard
boldness
CEO turnover
M&As
new CEOs
strategic uncertainty
time dependence
upper echelons
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oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/4243
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repository_id_str
spelling When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A AnnouncementsBetschinger, Marie-AnnMoschieri, CaterinaBertrand, OlivierAidli, Mahmoud53 Ciencias Económicas::5311 Organización y dirección de empresasODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidasacquisition hazardboldnessCEO turnoverM&Asnew CEOsstrategic uncertaintytime dependenceupper echelonsNew CEO appointments can create strategic uncertainty for stakeholders, potentially undermining the CEO's position. While the stakeholder uncertainty perspective suggests CEOs may act boldly to clarify their strategic intentions during early tenure, the CEO life cycle perspective proposes that CEOs avoid such moves during early tenure, as they still need to learn. This study integrates these views to examine whether and when new CEOs under high strategic uncertainty make bold strategic choices during early tenure. Focusing on first acquisitions – especially large and cross-border deals – we argue that new CEOs have a higher hazard of announcing an acquisition under high strategic uncertainty, namely, outsider CEOs and those whose appointments were more negatively received. Leveraging the time CEOs spend in their role as a conceptual bridge between the two perspectives, we argue that the acquisition hazard under high strategic uncertainty increases over early tenure, as CEOs gather information and learn. Analysing 873 new US CEOs (2004–2020) with an extended Cox hazard model, we find a generally higher hazard of first acquisition announcements for outsider CEOs and those with more negative appointment reactions, especially for bolder deals. Evidence on time dependence is mixed, but more pronounced for outsider CEOs and large acquisitions.We thank our editor, Mirko Benischke, and the anonymous JMS editor and reviewers for their insight and constructive guidance throughout the review process. This study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) (430-2018-01123).YesPublishedWileySocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canadahttps://ror.org/02jjdwm7520262025info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1111/joms.13267https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4243https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.13267reponame:Repositorio IEinstname:IEInglésIE Business School430-2018-01123IE UniversityStrategyAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/42432026-06-15T12:40:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
title When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
spellingShingle When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
Betschinger, Marie-Ann
53 Ciencias Económicas::5311 Organización y dirección de empresas
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
acquisition hazard
boldness
CEO turnover
M&As
new CEOs
strategic uncertainty
time dependence
upper echelons
title_short When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
title_full When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
title_fullStr When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
title_full_unstemmed When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
title_sort When do Firms with New CEOs Engage in M&A? Understanding the Timing of New CEOs' First M&A Announcements
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Betschinger, Marie-Ann
Moschieri, Caterina
Bertrand, Olivier
Aidli, Mahmoud
author Betschinger, Marie-Ann
author_facet Betschinger, Marie-Ann
Moschieri, Caterina
Bertrand, Olivier
Aidli, Mahmoud
author_role author
author2 Moschieri, Caterina
Bertrand, Olivier
Aidli, Mahmoud
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 53 Ciencias Económicas::5311 Organización y dirección de empresas
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
acquisition hazard
boldness
CEO turnover
M&As
new CEOs
strategic uncertainty
time dependence
upper echelons
topic 53 Ciencias Económicas::5311 Organización y dirección de empresas
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
acquisition hazard
boldness
CEO turnover
M&As
new CEOs
strategic uncertainty
time dependence
upper echelons
description New CEO appointments can create strategic uncertainty for stakeholders, potentially undermining the CEO's position. While the stakeholder uncertainty perspective suggests CEOs may act boldly to clarify their strategic intentions during early tenure, the CEO life cycle perspective proposes that CEOs avoid such moves during early tenure, as they still need to learn. This study integrates these views to examine whether and when new CEOs under high strategic uncertainty make bold strategic choices during early tenure. Focusing on first acquisitions – especially large and cross-border deals – we argue that new CEOs have a higher hazard of announcing an acquisition under high strategic uncertainty, namely, outsider CEOs and those whose appointments were more negatively received. Leveraging the time CEOs spend in their role as a conceptual bridge between the two perspectives, we argue that the acquisition hazard under high strategic uncertainty increases over early tenure, as CEOs gather information and learn. Analysing 873 new US CEOs (2004–2020) with an extended Cox hazard model, we find a generally higher hazard of first acquisition announcements for outsider CEOs and those with more negative appointment reactions, especially for bolder deals. Evidence on time dependence is mixed, but more pronounced for outsider CEOs and large acquisitions.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
2026
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.13267
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4243
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.13267
url https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.13267
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/4243
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.13267
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv IE Business School
430-2018-01123
IE University
Strategy
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio IE
instname:IE
instname_str IE
reponame_str Repositorio IE
collection Repositorio IE
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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